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CONCLUDING COMMENTS: THE COPYRIGHT 
ACT 1968 FORTY YEARS ON 
 
Professor Sam Ricketson1 
 
 
It seems such a short time, but, in the forty years since it came into operation, the 
Copyright Act 1968 has moved from being a rather peripheral enactment which was 
really only known to the few initiated in its mysteries to a sizable2 piece of legislation 
that lies at the centre of so much of our daily economic, social and cultural life. 
Ignored, reviled, admired or sanctified (it all depends where one is standing), it is a 
legislative achievement whose mid-life anniversary is well worth celebrating today. 
Indeed, real life and architectural analogies readily come to mind when one considers 
the Copyright Act 1968 in all its present day, much-amended, glory. Take real life first. 
If one remembers that it began its life as a relatively sleek and well muscled Act 
(although still more fully developed than its even slimmer 1911 and 1905 ancestors), it 
remained thus for well over a decade, but then gained steady accretions of muscle and 
flesh, with some nine substantive sets of amendments since 1980 that have now turned 
it into a bloated and blurred version of its original self. 
 Middle age is not treating the Act kindly, particularly when one considers the lateral 
extensions that have occurred, with the journey between some provisions that were 
previously simply numerical now requiring a clamber, several times over, through all 
the letters of the alphabet (just try going now from ss 131 to 133, and finding some 46 
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pages of intervening provisions from s 131A to s 132C; the trip from s 135 to s 136 is 
even more demanding, with some 102 pages of intervening text, beginning at s 135AA 
and ending at s 135ZZZE). Middle aged sag assumes a rather disconcerting image 
when one sees these alphabetical folds of legislative fat flowing over a now invisible 
waistline down to the ground. 
The metaphor should not be taken too far. It is all too easy to point to complex and 
wordy provisions, and rush to judgment as to their utility. Very often, however, they 
do mean something quite precise from the perspective of particular addressees, and 
represent delicate compromises that have been made between competing interests and 
policies (this is certainly true of the educational provisions in Parts VA and VB). 
Furthermore, some valiant attempts at slimming down have been made, although the 
difficulties involved should not be underestimated. In this regard, the simplification 
proposals of the former Copyright Law Review Committee (the “CLRC”) should be 
remembered.  
These embodied a new and original scheme of classification of subject matter and 
rights,3 as well as an extensive streamlining of exceptions and limitations.4 The 
difficulty, of course, lies in proposing such a radical weight loss program, when so 
many other issues, such as the internet and the digital agenda, were also clamouring 
for attention. Legislators and policymakers, perhaps, may be forgiven for not taking up 
the reformist programme offered them by the CLRC. A good piece of management 
advice might be, “never let the immediate crowd out the important”, but this is a 
nostrum that is usually impossible to act upon when developments occur at such a 
frantic pace, and appear to call for urgent and immediate attention.  
Architectural metaphors, however, may offer a more rewarding insight into the 1968 
Act and its achievements. The UK Whitford Committee in 1977 offered such a view 
when it described the development of UK copyright laws up to the time of the 
Copyright Act 1956 (UK) in the following terms: 
15. The first Copyright Act was enacted in 1710 (8 Anne c 19) and dealt only 
with books. This Act may be likened to a modest Queen Anne house to which 
there has since been Georgian, Victorian, Edwardian and finally Elizabethan 
additions, each adding embellishments in the style of the times …5 
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In the case of the 1968 Act, one may not want to pause too long in contemplating the 
exterior (a very bland 60’s glass and concrete construction), or the internal fittings (the 
language and terminology of the legislative draftspersons is frequently dark and 
obscure). However, the layout of rooms is not without some coherence, even elegance. 
It is certainly instructive. Consider the following: 
 The ante-rooms and reception rooms: a rather cluttered cloakroom area (full 
of definitions and interpretations in Part II), leading to more spacious 
galleries with clearly defined sections for works and their exclusive rights, 
connecting factors, term of protection, and provisions on infringement (Part 
III, Divisions 1 and 2). The first time visitor can stroll through these and gain 
a reasonable understanding of what is contained in the rest of the building. 
 A parallel set of smaller reception rooms running along on the side for 
subject-matter other than works, with clearly defined alcoves for each specific 
subject-matter (Part IV, Divisions 2 to 6). The rooms likewise are reasonably 
accessible to the first time visitor. 
 Smaller rooms running off the side of each of the larger reception rooms: this, 
however, is where things start to become confusing. Some of the rooms are 
crowded, but still relatively accessible and possible to navigate, at least in 
some parts (for example, the fair dealing provisions in Part III, Division 3, 
and Part IV, Division 6, and the artistic work exceptions in Part III, Division 
7); others are lined with further series of compartments that are nonetheless 
reasonably easy to locate and are relatively self-contained (for example, the 
computer program exceptions in Part III, Division 4A); others again have 
some rather timeworn but familiar items of furniture where the “industry 
players” will have little difficulty (such as the provisions dealing with the 
recording of musical works in Part III, Division 6). But there are some rooms 
that are really quite dangerous to enter, either because they are so crowded 
that one needs an expert guide to find one’s way through (such as the library 
and archives provisions in Part III, Division 5) or because they have some 
nasty hidden traps that no amount of amending legislation has ever quite 
managed to remove (for example, the designs/copyright overlap provisions in 
Part III, Division 8). None of these rooms, however, are very comfortable for 
the first time entrant. 
 The large entertaining rooms that adjoin the reception areas, once reasonably 
welcoming, have also become steadily more cluttered: 
o The remedies hall (Part V), once clearly laid out and easy to walk 
through, has now had some complicated extensions made to it, for 
example, the technological circumvention measures, electronic 
rights management and safe harbour annexes (Divisions 2AA and 
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2A), to say nothing of the particularly hazardous and bristling 
basement area under the hall, where the criminal offence and penalty 
provisions (Division 5) are now filed away neatly for ready 
deployment.  
o The statutory licence halls (Parts VA,-VC), while complex in their 
appointments, are more readily justifiable, in that few will enter here 
unless they (a) are one of the affected parties, such as an educational 
institution or a collecting society, and (b) will almost invariably be 
accompanied by a skilled guide (in-house counsel, legal adviser, and 
the like). The same is true of the rambling Division 6 passageway 
which deals with the Copyright Tribunal. There is really no need for 
any member of the general public to wander down these halls and 
passage ways, although clearer signs, such as “Administration – only 
authorised personnel to enter”, might be helpful here.  
 There are some discreet (and discrete) rear rooms where entry will only be 
required for very specific purposes, such as Crown use (Part VII), or where 
the only appreciative audience will be lawyers and no one else will ever need 
to enter (I refer here to the transitional and miscellaneous sections in 
Divisions X and XI).  
 Finally, there are some large structures that really sit to the rear or side of the 
building, although there are some narrow connecting doors, often hard to 
find, that provide a linkage back to the main structure: moral rights (of two 
distinct kinds in Division IX) and performers’ rights (Part XIA). It might be 
tempting to liken these to conservatories, and the plants to be found inside 
are certainly exotic, at least so far as Australian copyright law traditions are 
concerned. They are fragile and delicately framed, and readily cut down. 
It is all too easy to flog a metaphor too far, but the above serves to illustrate the large 
and sprawling structure and scope of the Copyright Act 1968. To return to our earlier 
metaphor, the Act is a complex organism, but is not an invertebrate: there is still an 
identifiable and recognizable spine running through it and providing it with a 
semblance of sense and organisation. The above metaphors also enable the making of 
some larger points: 
1. Simplification, while desirable at one level, is not a goal in itself: so long as the 
relevant provisions are accessible and meaningful to those who must deal with 
them, it is of little consequence that they are not comprehensible to the rest of us 
(if we never have to use them). There are horses for courses: it may be defensible 
for the provisions of Parts VA and VB to rejoice in their present complexity if 
they nonetheless provide clear pathways for the relevant parties to track their way 
through and to achieve some acceptable resolution. Complexity, on the other 
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hand, may be unforgivable in the case of sections of more general application: for 
example, do we need over 40 pages of text to give effect to moral rights provisions 
that are comprehended within a few lines of text in the relevant international 
conventions?6 
2. Some complexity is also understandable (and hence forgivable) as an index of 
human failing. The parallel importation provisions, for example, reflect the deep 
public policy divisions that have arisen, and continue to arise, over this difficult 
question, particularly in relation to books. Complex procedures and timelines 
simply embody the results of the uneasy compromises that have been reached 
here, and reflect the lack of resolution applying at the policy level. 
3. Nowhere is this complexity and policy division more exposed than in the case of 
exceptions and limitations: the proliferation and dissemination of these 
throughout the Act underlines sharply the need for some kind of simplification or 
streamlining, even perhaps the adoption of a single, flexible, open-ended, 
omnibus fair use provision, as suggested by the CLRC over a decade ago. But 
while this might reduce the Act significantly in length, would it really achieve its 
goals of clarity and simplicity, other than to displace the work of negotiation and 
compromise on the part of legislators, lobbyists and officials to the courts? In the 
long term, this may well mean more expense and time, and less comprehensive 
solutions. Matters that are unlitigated may simply lead to holes in protection 
where no one benefits. 
4. Some of the causes of the more recent legislative bloat in the 1968 Act come from 
external sources, rather than being the direct fault of our legislators and policy 
makers. While we have sought diligently, perhaps too much so in the case of 
performers’ moral rights, to give effect to our international obligations under the 
Berne Convention, the WCT and the WPPT, we have had some other things forced 
upon us in the form of the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement, with its 
bewildering series of provisions that seek to transplant and replicate US legislative 
provisions Down Under. Such deals are always fraught with difficulty, even where 
there might be the expectation of longer term benefits in other areas that have 
nothing to do with copyright, such as beef and primary products. So far as the 
Copyright Act 1968 is concerned, this has recently added significantly to its bulk 
and complexity. 
5. For all its defects, the 1968 Act has still had its admirers in other places, for 
example, in Singapore7 and Malaysia8 where it has provided a model for local law 
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making. This may suggest that the floor layout still remain usable, even if there is 
too much furniture cluttering up some of the rooms and annexes. In terms of 
legislative export, we should seek to build upon this experience and improve the 
product. 
The speakers in the present session have each provided fascinating insights into the 
history and development of this significant piece of private legislation.  
Ben Atkinson has highlighted some of the important pre-history, going back to the 
1911 Act and the even more interesting legislative predecessor, the Copyright Act 1905 
which was the first truly national copyright enactment in Australia.  
Two other speakers, Leslie Zines and John Gilchrist, have drawn attention to two 
particularly important stages in the early life of the 1968 Act: its beginnings and the 
work of the Spicer Committee, and the first significant response to technological 
development, in the form of photocopying and the Franki Committee review.  
Each of these inquiries was considerably more reflective and extensive than anything 
we have seen in more recent history. Spicer, indeed, was pre-computers and long 
before the advent of the networked environment; copyright in those days was seen as 
rather peripheral, of concern only to those involved in the “soft areas” of the arts: 
music, theatre, and publishing. Nonetheless, there were significant commercial 
interests involved, in particular those of broadcasters and sound recording companies, 
while the concerns of educationalists and libraries were also beginning to be voiced. 
Nonetheless, nearly nine years elapsed before the 1968 Act was finally passed 
(although Adrian Sterling tells a revealing story of some of the lobbying on the part of 
the record industry that preceded this).  
Once passed, however, the new Act seemed to slumber in its slips for a decade or so, 
while the importance of one particular new form of technology – the photocopier – 
was pursued in the courts,9 and then ultimately became the focus of the next 
significant review by the Franki Committee. After this, the floodgates of regular review 
and amendment were opened up, and this has remained a continuous torrent. 
Copyright in this latter period moved much more to the centre of things, although 
perhaps without the time, care and resources that were possible in the case of the 
Spicer and Franki reports. 
Sara Bannerman and Susy Frankel provide interesting perspectives from the outside. 
Both Canada and New Zealand, despite their common colonial backgrounds with 
                                                                                                                                                    
8 Copyright Act 1987 ((Malaysia). 
9 See, in particular, UNSW v Moorhouse (1975) 133 CLR 1, and see further S Ricketson and D 
Catterns, “Of vice-chancellors and authors: UNSW v Moorhouse” in Andrew T Kenyon, Megan 
Richardson and Sam Ricketson (eds), Landmarks in Australian Intellectual Property Law, 
Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2009, pp 97–109. 
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Australia, have different copyright histories, marked by a measure of independent 
initiative not present in our own. Even at an early stage, Canada was unhappy with the 
application of the Berne Convention to it (Bannerman’s account of the visit of the 
Canadian premier, Sir John Thomson’s visit to Windsor to seek permission to 
denounce it is similar to the much later, and successful, effort by the Australian prime 
minister, James Scullin, to secure the appointment of Sir Isaac Isaacs as the first 
Australian-born governor general), and the notion of Canada as a developing country 
and “copyright middle power” is an appealing one for Australia to aspire to, in seeking 
to establish its own international copyright identity.  
Susy Frankel, in the case of New Zealand, points to one particular instance of decisive 
independence, in the case of parallel importation prohibitions. There are others: for 
example, the recommendations of the Dalgleish Committee in relation to the question 
of term (New Zealand, unlike Australia, saw little advantage for it in the adoption of 
the 50 year post auctorem term of protection).10  
In all, this has been a fascinating and event-filled forty years of copyright history in 
Australia, and one that will clearly merit further investigation of its internal workings 
by historians such as Ben Atkinson. The onset of early middle age suggests that some 
weight loss may be in order, but the relevance and centrality of the Act to our national 
economic, social and cultural life can be doubted no longer.  
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